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Risk and Trust in Cross-Sector R&D Projects
ABSTRACT
The Cooperative Research Centres are hybrid organizations at the leading edge of change in
Australia's research culture and are key elements in the new lmowledge infrastructure contributing to
technological innovation. The paper presents findings from a qualitative study of CRC managers'
perceptions and management of downside risk in commercially-focused R&D projects. CRC managers
deal with both performance risks (arising from uncertainties about achieving goals) and relational risks
(arising from collaborative relationships). They do so through formalisation, the selection of people
with desirable characteristics, and the building of relationships. Underlying these risk mitigation
strategies is the formation of trust (a willingness to rely on a partner in whom one has confidence), and
this occurs at both interorganizational and project levels.
Keywords: technological innovation, R&D, risk, trust.
INTRODUCTION
It is now widely recognised that, contrary to the classic linear' model of innovation (e.g. Bush 1945),
technological innovation most often results from linkages and interactions among a number of
organizations. This phenomenon has recently been encapsulated in Chesbrough's notion of 'open
innovation' (Chesbrough 2003), i.e. in the so-called 'knowledge economy', wherein knowledge is
widely distributed, firms need to rely more on external knowledge for innovation and can no longer
solely rely on more closed internal R&D and innovation processes. Within this emergent context, and
contributing to it, there have also been major changes in university-government-industry inter-
relationships (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997), driven by both public policy and industry strategy.
According to the 'Triple Helix' framework, these inter-relationships are now characterised by three
features (Etzkowitz and Klofsten 2005): (a) a more prominent role for universities in innovation, (b)
increasing cross-sector collaboration in R&D, and (c) a tendency for each sector to take on the role of
the others with, for example, 'entrepreneurial universities' taking some of the roles that industry and
government have traditionally played within national innovation systems (Etzkowitz, Webster,
Gebhardt & Terra 2000). As part of the 'new knowledge infrastructure' (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff
2000), various 'hybrid organizations' have been created at the interface of the public and private
sectors to pursue or facilitate R&D, as exemplified in Australia by the Cooperative Research Centre
(CRC) Program. This Program was established by the Australian Government in 1990 specifically to
encourage cooperation amongst researchers, mainly located in universities and public sector resear'ch
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agencies, and research users mainly located in the private sector. It was hoped that this would
strengthen the links between research and its practical application, thereby fostering technological
innovation in the Australian economy.
While the benefits of this type of cross-sector collaboration have often been emphasized, the resulting
ventures are often notOliously difficult to manage, not least because they bring together organizations
with quite different cultures, interests, objectives, modes of operation, capabilities, timeframes, and
commitments. But, despite a burgeoning literature which provides advice on how such cross-sector
research collaborations can be made more effective (e.g. Geisler 1995; Cyert and Goodman 1997;
Santoro and Chakrabarti 1999; Santoro and Betts 2002; Starbuck 2001; Barnes, Pashby & Gibbons
2002, 2006), there remains a dearth of empirical studies on the nature of the cooperative interactions
and processes involved (Mora-Valentin, Montoro-Sanchez & Guerras-Martin 2004; Thune 2007).
Furthermore, although the CRC Program has been formally evaluated twice since it was established,
there have been relatively few studies of the operation and management of the CRCs as hybrid
organizations at the leading edge of change in Australia's research culture (Turpin 1997; Garrett-
Jones, Turpin, Burns & Diment 2005). In this paper we seek to address this knowledge gap in what
has become an increasingly important area for universities, industry and, more generally, the economy
in Australia. We do so by reporting selected findings from a broader study of the CRCs as a medium
for facilitating cross-sector R&D collaboration, and hence technological innovation, in Australia. In
the study repOlted here we investigated the management of risk in commercially-focused CRC
projects (i.e. those established with the intention of producing some return on the investment through,
for example, new materials, products, technologies, and production processes, in contrast to those
projects which are more concerned with producing 'public good' knowledge). These projects are
central to the achievement of the program's economic benefits and they are often seen as particularly
risky for the partners in that, while much is at stake (e.g. in terms of investment, reputation, and
financial returns), there is considerable uncertainty about the achievement of 'successful', mutually-
beneficial and profitable outcomes.
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We develop the paper, which is focused more on interpreting empirical data than on elucidating a
theoretical framework, in the following way. We first provide an overview of the qualitative research
methods used and then, drawing on the findings, we expand on the nature of risk and its management
in the study's context. We conclude with a discussion of trust, an emergent construct in the analysis of
our data, and its role in mitigating perceptions of risk among CRC participants.
RESEARCH METHODS
Our overall aim 111 this part of the study was to gain an understanding of how CRC managers
perceived and dealt with risk (which we defined as 'downside risk', the possibility that actions pursued
within a collaborative partnership can go wrong, or not according to plan, resulting in some cost or
other adverse consequence to one or more of the partners) in commercially-focused projects. We were
interested in management perceptions of risk and how these informed management decision-making
and action. As tIllS was an exploratory study, we used a qualitative research approach and collected
data through in-depth semi-structured interviews. Our sample comprised 10 CRC managers (i.e. at
board and senior management levels) in four CRCs from the two main sectors of the program that had
a strong commercialisation focus (i.e. Manufacturing Technology, and Medical Science and
Technology). Interviewees were selected on the basis of their extensive knowledge and experience of
the CRC Program. Interviews followed a schedule of six open-ended questions derived from our
research objectives (e.g. 'In your view, what are the risks facing the CRC? We are interested here in
sources of risk both for the CRC itself and for its R&D projects'). The interviews ran for 45 - 90
minutes and were tape recorded. The recordings were transcribed and the resulting interview
transcripts were subject to qualitative content analysis following the approach described by Flick
(1988: 192 - 196).
RISKS IN CROSS-SECTOR R&D COLLABORAnONS
Our qualitative study focused on the lisks faced by partners in the CRC Program, wherein lisk can be
transferred from one sector to another. Thus, to enter into a collaboration exposes organizations to
particular risks, and this has long been recognized in the interorganizational collaboration literature
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(e.g. Powell 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven 1997; Das and
Teng 1999,2001; Nooteboom 1999; Genefke 2001). Prior to the study we had formulated a typology
of risks in this form of interorganizational collaboration (Couchman and Fulop 2002a, 2002b) and we
used this framework to help make sense of the data. We firstly distinguished between risks that arise
from the collaborative venture itself and those that arise from the relationship between the
collaborating organizations. The former, which are a particular problem for collaborations involving
difficult or novel ventures such as R&D projects (Ring and Van de Ven 1989), arise from uncertainties
about the venture being able to achieve its goals despite the best efforts of the partners. Such
uncertainties arise either from the environment (e.g. government policy changes, fluctuations within
national and global economies, changes in markets, structural changes in relevant industries, etc.) or
from the venture itself (i.e. arising from its goals, organization, management and resources), and
which do not result from any opportunistic intentions of the parties or from external events. Das and
Teng (1999) have referred to such risks as performance risks, and they note that they are shared by all
of the partners. Relational risks, on the other hand, are unique to interorganizational collaboration and
arise from the resource commitments made, and the relationships of dependence entered into, by
collaborating organizations. A major problem here is the possibility of opportunism (de Laat 1997),
i.e. one or more of the partners, in pursuing their own self-interest, may act to the detriment of the
other partners. Opportunistic risks include the possibility of (a) one partner exploiting the other
partners to its own advantage, e.g. by breaking confidentiality agreements, misappropriating
proprietary knowledge, appropriating all or a disproportionate share of benefits, etc., or (b) a partner
not fully committing to the venture, e.g. by not providing agreed resources, harbouring hidden
agendas, and delivering unsatisfactory products or services.
Our qualitative research revealed a heightened awareness of risks among CRC managers.
Performance risks (e.g. required knowledge may not result from the research undertaken, critical
competencies may not be accessible by project teams, interorganizational communication and
management processes may be inadequate, critical human and technical resources may not be
available, and financial resources may be inadequate) were identified, and were generally the focus of
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formal risk management and project review processes, but it was the relational risks that were seen to
be of particular concern. Given the space constraints of a conference paper, we illustrate this with
three examples. The first arises from power imbalances which can lead to disadvantages and costs to
certain of the partners or to the CRC itself:
CRCs are held over a barrel by their industry partners to licence technology to them at
discounted rates and with deals that do not benefit the research providers to the same
extent as the industry partners. IndustlY partners always have the threat of withdrawal
from the CRC as a bargaining tool that gives them the upper hand in commercial
negotiations with the CEOs of CRCs. The need for industry money within a CRC is a
stronger motivation than upsetting a research provider.
The second is the lisk of role subversion faced by public sector research organizations through their
participation in these relationships (Nature 2001; Stephan 2001; Tijssen 2004; Fulop and Couchman
2006) and encompasses a loss of credibility as independent sources of authoritative knowledge with a
potential for damage to their reputation, a dilution of their 'public good' knowledge creation and
dissemination role, and an undermining of the trust dynamics that are central to the institutional
framework of scientific research wherein there is an open sharing of knowledge within scientific
communities. This latter problem was neatly encapsulated by an interviewee: 'Researchers are under
increasing pressures to ... publish [and] secure IP/commercialise. There is a risk that the second
dictates the first and stifles scientific progress.'
Thirdly, the managers were aware and wary of opportunistic pm1ners and the risks that they present to
CRCs. One CEO, in discussing the problem of confidential knowledge spillovers, put the case as
follows:
I could not be the Director of a CRC that had [XYZ] as its core partner, I ethically,
personally could not do that ... they're certainly at this point under investigation by the
FDA for misrepresentation offailure rates and problems ofdesign of their technology.
They basically iI~fringed our patents, they've employed people who've stolen our
intellectual property. I think they are one of the most unethical companies I've ever dealt
with. They've made false claims on their website that affect patients' choice of
[therapeutic] device . ....
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MANAGING THE RISKS IN CROSS-SECTOR R&D COLLABORAnONS
We found that these risks are addressed within the CRCs in three main ways. Firstly, there is a strong
emphasis on formalisation (which, following Vlaar, Van den Bosch & Volberda 2006: 1619, we
define as 'contracts, rules and procedures .... as well as processes of codification and enforcement') in
the establishment of a CRC and its ongoing management. The core partners enter into a contractual
agreement with the Australian Government which clearly stipulates the roles, responsibilities and
commitments of the organizations which constitute the CRe's core collaborators. Formal structures
are also provided for in the agreement, usually with a top-level Executive Board (consisting of senior
representatives of the partner organizations) which has overall responsibility for the CRe's direction,
membership and policy. This top-level Board may be complemented with other formal management
committees, such as Program and Project Review Committees, the actual structures adopted being
contingent on the specific circumstances of the CRe. The day-to-day management of a CRC is usually
overseen by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who has duties and responsibilities similar to those in
the corporate sector. Reporting to the CEO is an hierarchy of managers with formally-prescribed roles,
e.g. Business Manager, Research Program Manager, and Project Leaders. Formal procedures prescribe
regular meetings of the Board, annual meetings of all CRC participants, and the establishment of
projects. Projects are set up under a Project Agreement negotiated among a sub-set of the CRC
partners, and this specifies the roles and tasks, responsibilities, resource and performance
commitments, financial and in-kind contIibutions, as well as the rights with respect to any resulting
intellectual property. Such agreements seek to provide a clear framework for managing the project,
through agreed structures and procedures, in order to achieve the agreed goals or 'deliverables'.
Another notable feature of the CRC Program is the Government's requirement for regular assessment
and reporting, so all CRCs are constantly engaged in a process of evaluation against set performance
criteria.
In a risky, ambiguous and uncertain setting, this formalisation attenuates relational and performance
risks by helping the disparate participants 'make sense' of their involvement in a CRC (Weick 1995),
i.e. helping them to achieve congruent understandings of what the CRC means both to them and to the-
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other partners in the collaboration (as one of our interviewees put it: 'attempting to understand each
other's agendas and points of view rather than juggling nine or ten'). This is extremely necessary in
the context of cross-sector collaboration, given the divergent world views of public sector research
agencies, universities and companies which can easily lead to different interpretations and
understandings of the requirements and roles played by different palticipants within the CRe.
Another means by which the risks are addressed is through the selection and appointment of people
with what are seen to be desirable characteristics to play key roles. Having the 'right people' is a
recurrent theme among CRC managers (as one of them put it: 'having the right people and the right
processes in place, and having people who are willing to do a lot of work for the centre'), and refers to
all levels in the CRe. At the top this starts with the board, where it is generally seen to be important
that the chairperson is independent, experienced in running a board and able to resolve any problems
among the board members, and is able to develop a good working relationship with the CEO. Board
members represent their organizations in the collaboration, and an important requirement for 'the right
people on the board' is that they are able to consider the interests of the CRC (not just those of their
organization) and so be supportive of its initiatives and activities. CEOs are pivotal managers,
according to our interviewees, and they playa crucial role in developing a vision and cohesive identity
for the eRC, in ensuring that the CRC performs as required by all of its stakeholders, and that the
needs of the collaborating partners are met. The experiences of our interviewees had convinced them
that the board chair and CEO were decisive in ensuring the success of a CRC (and if they acted
inappropriately could be primarily responsible for a CRe's demise). The value of effective project
leaders was also recognised by the CRC managers: good project leaders not only manage their project
teams by ensuring the pelformance of tasks as required, on schedule and within budget, they also
manage upwards to champion the project, represent it to the management hierarchy as well as other
stakeholders (e.g. to the industry partners), and they maintain a regime of regular reporting on project
progress. As for the researchers, the desirable features are seen to be technical capability, commitment,
reliability, trustworthiness, and an ability to work productively within the operating parameters of the
commercially-focused CRe. One of our interviewees summarised the attributes of these researchers in
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terms of 'you know they are going to deliver'. With such people on the board, in management and
conducting the project work, relational and performance risks are much less likely to be a problem
according to our interviewees.
Thirdly, CRC managers spend much of their time building relationships in an attempt to pre-empt
these risks ('The art of risk management, and exactly what you're doing [as a CRC manager], is
managing the relationship'), both within the organization and especially with the industry partners.
One Program Manager in a very successful and long-lived CRC observed that:
Wefind that [industry collaboration] really is velY, very tough, or can be velY tough, and
you certainly need a close personal relationship with whoever it is that's the champion or
the Director on the industlY side and the person [who is] their counterpart [on the CRC
side]. See you have to build [collaboration] at all levels. You have to have senior
management having a good relationship with the project teams.
This perspective was supported by the chairman of a CRC Boaxd:
It's the sort of thing you can't drive from the supply side. It's got to be from the demand
side. But that is built like everything else; it's built upon relationships, with personal
relationships and good working relationships at all levels. You know, good working
relationships with [the industry partner's] board and with [their] CEO.
From the CEO's perspective, building relationships with the CRC partners ('being good at partnering')
is an activity that is focused on achieving partner commitment to the CRC, and this can be fostered by
helping the partners to recognise the value of the collaboration, by ensuring that partners become
involved in the CRC's research program ('making sure [they] feel part of the research'), and by being
responsive to the partners' needs. As one CRC Program Manager put it:
... it's about being responsive, it's about delivering on time ... it's about helping solve
their problems, not the ones you \,vould like to solve. It's about communication, it's about
all those things [which] make them feel that it's damn good working with you because
things happen.
Open and frequent conullunication is central to this relationship-building, as emphasised by a number
of the CRC managers, although it was seen to be difficult in a networked geographically-dispersed
organization like many of the CRCs:
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I think good communication is vel)! difficult to attain. ... our members [are part} of a
large joint venture, spread all around the country and we're a network organization.
What you need to make a network organization work is ... you've got to have the
processes in place, you need a very good website .first of all and you need a damn good
full-time communication manager to [ensure that i1lformation is shared} ... evel)!body can
see what's going on and evel)!body can talk to one another ... So, although [you are part
ofa} network, you have a sense ofbeing...
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For our interviewed managers, communication was essential to achieving a sense of belonging and
thus commitment to the organization ('make people feel that they belong to something that is
worthwhile'), and a number of them worked hard to ensure that this happened within their CRCs
through formal and informal processes.
Building sustainable relationships rests on the formation of trust ('You've worked together and you
get to know people and you trust them'). Where that trust is formed, and is reinforced over repeated
interactions (wherein reliability, trustworthiness and goodwill are demonstrated), then relational and
performance risks cease to become a significant concern for CRC managers. So, after pursuing our
initial interest in risk, we came to trust. Formal mechanisms for dealing with risks - such as contracts,
agreements, and reporting procedures - are not foolproof and neither can they cover all contingencies
likely to arise in the uncertain context of cross-sector R&D. Trust dynamics can playa central role
here, and are essential to the success of collaborations in which relational continuity is important (e.g.
Powell 1990; Ring and Van de Ven 1992, 1994), especially for those which involve high levels of
uncertainty about outcomes, as is the case with R&D projects (e.g. Ring and Van de Ven 1989;
Hausler, Hohn & Lutz 1995). Further, the other two means of dealing with lisk that we identified in
our study, selecting the right people and building relationships, both involve trust.
TRUST IN CROSS-SECTOR R&D COLLABORAnONS
Trust is a belief or expectation held by individuals, or groups of individuals, about other individuals,
groups or entities such as social institutions and organizations. This attitude involves a subjective
assessment about whether to expose oneself to vulnerability in situations of risk or uncertainty
(Luhmann 1988: 96). To trust is to accept vulnerability (i.e. the possibility that some harm to the
trusting person could result), and is based on positive expectations about others (Mayer, Davis &
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Schoorman 1995) where there is some uncertainty about the future behaviour of those in whom the
trust is placed and on whom there is some degree of dependence (creating the risk that the trust is
misplaced). This belief or expectation creates a behavioural disposition (e.g. 'a willingness to rely on a
pariner in whom one has confidence', Moorman, Zaltman & Deshpande 1992: 315) and leads to
trusting behaviour (e.g. acts of entering into a business partnership, engaging in an economic
transaction, etc.). Trust is built through repeated interactions (Zucker 1986; Gulati 1995; Kramer,
Brewer & Hanna 1996), in which the trustor learns that the risk of trusting another is WOlih taking. It
is also dynamic (Nooteboom and Six 2003), in that trust towards another may change over time due to
changing circumstances or to experience.
In our study we learned that trust develops and is maintained within relationships at two inter-related
levels: (a) inter-personal relationships among the members of a CRC project team, and (b)
interorganizational relationships among the partners in a CRC and from whom project teams are
drawn. For this type of collaboration, understanding the multiple levels of relationships is important
(Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone 1998). The first level of relationships involves both researchers and
industry personnel working together towards a common goal. Within the project teams, however, trust
is developed not just among researchers within a disciplinary field, but also among researchers in
different disciplinary fields (e.g. surface chemistry, polymer chemistry, and ophthalmology) and
between researchers and industry-based team members; here trust may be problematic due to different
norms, socialisation processes and sanction systems of the participants. However, within a project
team, trust can be developed over repeated interactions where the participants come to learn that the
others are reliable, trustworthy, open and fair in their dealings, and unlikely to take advantage of other
team members for short term gain (Tapon and Thong 1999).
At the interorganizational relationship level, a set of firms and public sector organizations with an
interest 111 an area of industrial applications (e.g. medicine, the manufacture of automobiles, the
development of computer software, etc.) enter into a contractual agreement with each other and the
Government to pursue mutually-agreed research and education programs. Interorganizational trust is
the result of trust among decisive individuals at different levels across the organizations (e.g. higher
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level managers in universities and firms), and these interpersonal trusting relationships may vary
among the different organizations, with changes in personnel, and over time in response to changing
situations. Trust between two organizations thus arises where there are 'two sets of individuals each of
which is trusting the organization of which the others are members' (Blois 1999: 203). These are
interorganizational relationships in which the individuals involved make judgements about other
organizations and the individuals in them. But they do so at least partly as a function of their
organizational roles (Ring and Van de Ven 1994: 95; Nooteboom 1999: 35), and this role-playing
behaviour may int1uence their perceptions of others (Blois 1999: 210). Over time, and with repeated
interactions between the organizations where positive outcomes result and there are no negative
effects, the relationship can become habitualised and the trusting behaviour institutionalised
(Nooteboom et al. 1997). Where this occurs, the trust relations have become ingrained in the routines
and practices of the collaborati ve venture and the partners within it (Dodgson 1993), thereby
transcending interpersonal relationships.
CONCLUSIONS
Trust among partners is an important element of the means through which CRC managers at different
levels build relationships and address the risks (performance-related and relational) faced by
organizations entering into this often 'risky' form of collaboration. Building sustainable and
productive relationships in this context rests on the formation of trust among the participants. Where
that trust is formed, and is reinforced over repeated transactions, then relational and performance risks
cease to become a major concern for CRC managers. Trust reduces uncet1ainty among partners and
the fear of opportunism, it enhances cooperative behaviour so contributing to higher partner
satisfaction and partnership efficacy, it minimises the effort required for contract negotiation and
monitoring, it encourages the sharing of proprietary information and new knowledge (critical for R&D
partnerships), and through such mechanisms reduces transaction costs as well as the subjective tisk of
entering into a relationship.
Given the nature of the cross-sector R&D collaboration we studied, the relationships involved have to
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be understood in terms of multiple levels and the interactions among them. Thus, the conditions under
which trust can be formed and sustained can be theorised in terms of a multi-level process, comprising
the engagement of organizations at one level and with a subordinate level at which trust is formed and
maintained as project teams seek to develop effective working relationships and deliver on project
objectives. At the organizational level, the partners commit to the relationship (as they become part of
a CRC) and trust is imp01tant for the development of an effective collaboration among them because it
reduces complexity and uncertainty about the relationship. The organizational level of risk
containment and relationship building (e.g. the creation of formal systems and procedures, the
selection of key CRC managers and board members, the contractual agreements entered into, etc.),
with the resultant trust relations among the partner organizations, structures and shapes the formation
of trust at the project level. Projects are task-focused and have a limited life, they involve a subset of
the CRC partners, and they employ personnel who are only temporarily attached to the CRe. Here a
capability for effective communication helps manage expectations and develop common
understandings, reduces project risks and uncertainties, fosters commitment, contributes to the
building of a collective identity, and helps develop trust (Couchman and Fulop, 2004). Also critical at
this level is a capability for managing the 'cultural gap' between the sectors, through which it is
ensured that the operational timeframes of project team members are aligned, both commercially-
exploitable and published scholarly knowledge are produced, and the disparities in the organizational
cultures are managed for mutual satisfaction (Couchman and Beckett, 2006).
Cross-sector R&D collaboration is an increasingly important area in most developed economies like
Australia, with significant implications for the participants (notably for universities; Fulop and
Couchman, 2006). But it is risky, and the means used by managers to deal with the risks involved are
critical for the efficacy of the collaborative ventures. Our study has confirmed the imp01tance of
relationship building in addressing these risks and it highlights the importance of trust within and
across the organizations engaged in this form of R&D (see also Leibeskind and Oliver 1998). We hope
that other researchers will respond to this modest study to further develop our understanding of risk
and trust, as well as their forms, determinants and consequences, in this important area.
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